I dreaded reading it. It took me almost a week to finally comb through the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. Four days may not seem like much time to you. But for someone like me who is so passionate about educational justice, it seemed like an eternity.
I thought the 20-page opinion would leave me outraged. And why torture yourself when you do not have to. Then again, I have to. It was a must read for me, and it should be a must read for anyone who is passionate about educational justice, anyone studying race and education, anyone striving to diversify (or homogenize) our academy.
His words did not torture me. I did not get up from my computer fuming. I got up from my computer thinking, disagreeing, even agreeing.
I must admit I concur with some points in Justice Thomas’s opinion, points of agreement I examine in part two of this blog. I am happy he had the courage to say them, and I hope they start a national dialogue. But then there are more serious claims that warrant historical, logical, and factual clarification, which I sketch here.
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority to send the case back to the lower courts for another strict review. But he was ready to overrule Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), and explains his reasoning in his separate 20-page opinion.
Justice Thomas declares emphatically that “the educational benefits flowing from student body diversity” do not qualify as a compelling state interest. Indeed, he says, “the argument that educational benefits justify racial discrimination was advanced in support of racial segregation in the 1950’s, but emphatically rejected by this Court. And just as the alleged educational benefits of segregation were insufficient to justify racial discrimination then, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), the alleged educational benefits of diversity cannot justify racial discrimination today.”
